Mark Potocnik, Frank Ruda und Jan Völker (Ed.)

Beyond Potentialities?
Politics between the Possible and the Impossible
epistemological configuration with that whole mass of statements."57 Since there is always discourse the only way that remains open to the subject is to say the discourse by folding it back onto itself. Thought is split between being "a fragment of autobiography,"58 or being the novel of the epoch. Foucault further states: "I am analyzing the space in which I speak. I am laying myself open to undoing and recomposing that space which indicates to me the first indices of my discourse. I am seeking to disassociate its visible coordinates and shake up its surface immobility. I thus risk raising, in each instant and beneath each of my resolutions, the question of knowing whence it can arise, for everything I say could well have the effect of displacing the place from which I am saying it."59

59 Foucault, "On The Ways Of Writing History," p. 311. It seems that Foucault was here influenced by Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot: "In Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, experience has the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution. This is a project of desubjectivation. The idea of a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself is what was important to me in my reading of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, and what explains the fact that however boring, however erudite my books may be, I've always conceived of them as direct experiences aimed at pulling myself free of myself, at preventing me from being the same." Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," pp. 241–242.

Jason E. Smith

Strategy and the Passions
Guy Debord's Ruses

Order reigns but does not govern. G.D.

In a short but important lecture on the films of Guy Debord first given in 1995—a year after Debord's death, and therefore something of a eulogy or panegyric as well1—Giorgio Agamben begins with an anecdote. "Once," Agamben writes, "when I was tempted (as I still am) to consider Guy Debord a philosopher, he told me: 'I'm not a philosopher, I'm a strategist.' That's why I think where Debord is concerned, we should ask about the meaning that cinema could have in this strategy."2 A first remark to be made about this anecdote is that this characterization of Debord's writing as philosophical appears to be at odds with the first section of a long essay Agamben wrote on Debord's 1988 book Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle. That section's title: "Strategist." Today no author can be satisfied, Agamben argues, with writing a book that will endure the test of time; no author could take pleasure in the fact that a hundred years from now, he will still be read ("by what kind of human beings?" Agamben asks). A book's value is derived from its capacity to be deployed as a weapon on a terrain of struggle, or as a shield that aggressively protects the existence of already articulated forms-of-life. A book's value is in its use, its capacity for re-inscription within conflicts it does not necessarily anticipate. But it would be a mistake, he continues, to assume that the nature of the force field into which such books are sent is one defined by a "battle in which troops must be marshaled." Its field of action is the "pure power of the intellect"—a phrase drawn from the title of the Fifth Book of

1 Agamben's Mezze senza fine (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1996) is dedicated to Guy Debord: "Guy Debord, in memoriam."
Spinoza's *Ethics* (de potentia intellectus, sive de libertate). The Commentaries are, we are told, a "treatise on strategy" in the same way that the Ethics is, or Machiavelli's *Prince*.

Agamben's distinction between philosopher and strategist is misleading. What is implied by his characterization of Spinoza's *Ethics* as a manual of strategy is, in fact, an effacement of the distinction between strategy and philosophy. It implies a point of convergence not simply between ontology and politics, but between substance and power or, better, between existence and potentiality. Debord himself explicitly addressed this distinction between theory and strategy some years earlier in terms that diverge from Agamben's. In a February 1974 letter to Eduardo Rothe, a former member of the Situationist International – written just a few weeks before the first screening of the film version of Debord's sole book of "philosophy," *The Society of the Spectacle* – Debord argued that the time had come to move beyond the conceptual framework of his book from 1967. If in that book he relied on the dialectical theory of alienation developed in the philosophies of Hegel and the early Marx to describe the internal structure of a society in which everyday life has been "colonized" by the commodity form, now was the time to develop a complementary theory of historical action that was only implicit in his earlier book:

> The principle work that, it appears to me, one must engage in – as the complementary contrary to *The Society of the Spectacle*, which described frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit in it) – is the theory of historical action. One must advance strategic theory in its moment, which has come. At this stage and to speak schematically, the basic

3 It is well known, moreover, that Spinoza refers on several occasions to Machiavelli in the *Tractatus Politicus*; there's a large body of work, largely Italian, on the imbrication of or encounter between Spinoza's ontology and Machiavelli's political thought. I want to mention two recent books that develop this field of thought particularly well: Vittorio Morfino's *Il Tempo e L'Occasione* (Milan: Il Filarete, 2002), and Filippo Del Lucchese's *Conflict, Power and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza: Tumult and Imagination* (London/New York: Continuum, 2009). For a remarkable reading of Spinoza from the perspective of the strategic, see Laurent Bove, *La stratégie du conatus. Affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza* (Paris: Vrin, 1997). Given Spinoza's critique of finalism, however, it is necessary to disengage the concept of strategy from the logic of teleology – no easy task – in order to perform such a reading.

Debord makes clear in this passage that the necessity of this turn away from a critical social analysis of the ravages visited upon everyday life by the commodity form to the question of strategy is not a philosophical necessity: it is not a question of completing a philosophy system. It is the right time, he calculates, to propose a theory of the time of politics. What distinguishes strategy from philosophy is the necessity to take into account the timing of an action, and to evaluate its effect not from the perspective of its internal rationality, but from the point of view of the leverage it operates on a given terrain and its relations of force. In the voice-over of a film Debord made four years after sending this letter, *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni* [We turn round in the night and are consumed by fire], he was to declare: "Theories are made to die in the war of time: they are simply units of varying strength that must be deployed in combat at just the right moment."5

This turn of Debord's, from social critique to a theory of politics – from an analysis of the mechanisms of social mediation qua "separation" to a theory of political antagonism and even civil war – repeats a classical motif in the history of Marxist theory. Its two phases correspond to the necessity, in the early twentieth century, of developing a theory of the political to supplement the economic theory of the objective contradictions of capitalism. And, indeed, Debord's work during the 1970s – culminating in the completion of *In girum* and the publication of *Kriegsspiel*, his board game based in part on Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege*6 – represents an attempt to repeat, in order


to undo, the Bolshevik solution to this question (vanguard Party, self-dissolving worker's state).

In the beginning, there was war. Debord insists upon this. War is not simply an occasional interruption of the harmonious functioning of an otherwise stable society. Society is not only founded on a fundamental contradiction: it is nothing more than the management of a social war that acquires, at certain points, a level of intensity that can no longer be mediated by various mechanisms of spectacular administration. When Debord speaks of the *war of time*, he means just that: the war, the conflict, the tearing that time is. He is not referring to the fact that in the history of working class struggles, time – the time of the working day and so-called “free” time – has often been the object of conflict, nor is he emphasizing that in the society of the spectacle all social relations, including those that are formed in the time of non-work, are organized according to the logic of the image. Time is war because time is, according to a famous Hegelian formula, the *Dasein* of the concept, the being-here-and-now, in the contingency of what *might not have* come to pass, of theoretical abstractions. It is the element within which the theory proves itself and tests its mettle, the crucible in which the concept is negated, at once destroyed and brought to completion. Debord often cites a passage from Heraclitus that punctuates his own reflections on war: “conflict is the origin of things.”

A few lines below Debord’s remark that theories are made to die in the war of time, he offers the complementary thesis: “no living epoch starts out with a theory: it is first of all a game, a conflict, a journey.” A theory, or a philosophy, has its origins in a conflict that it must in turn join, as one “unit” among others, and into which it is sent to die.

The schema is classical. It is a variation on Marx, for whom it is as practice, in revolutionary praxis, that a theory is at once canceled and completed. A theory, to be what it is, must negate itself in order to pass into its other. A practice without theoretical concepts is blind, just as theory without revolutionary practice is empty. But there is another way of thinking about the relation between philosophy and strategy, which complicates the scheme deployed by Debord and implicitly endorsed by Agamben. In the concluding chapter of Lenin’s critical account of Ernst Mach’s “empirio-criticism,” he sketches a partisan conception of philosophy that is also materialist in a very specific way. In a paradoxical manner, Lenin identifies materialist philosophy not with a scientific concept of matter but, to the contrary, with the partisan act of dividing the philosophical field into camps whose configuration reflects, through a series of mediations, the class war that is at the “origin” of all theoretical discourse:

Behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one must not fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially, although it is concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new terms or by a feeble-minded non-partisanship, materialism and idealism.

This is not a sociology of philosophy. It is an identification of materialism with the act of division, with a theory of philosophical action that consists in the introduction of irreducible antagonism into a field whose entire vocation is to mediate difference, contradiction, and apparently irresolvable conflicts. A materialist theory does not consist in the production of a concept of matter that can be scientifically verified, or even submitted to the rules of classical philosophical argumentation. It is an assertion, an affirmation of the primacy of matter over consciousness that is deployed not as a thesis to be proven, but as an axiom that exceeds the philosophical infrastructure that will be deployed on the basis of its affirmation. I want to rephrase this in terms Lenin would not tolerate: philosophy finds its partisan edge and truth, then, in the moment of an originary *decision* that exceeds all verification. Its act is both modest and violent. It draws a line of demarcation that divides the field of philosophy into warring camps that, by definition, can never reach any agreement.

---

7 This famous line is evoked in Thesis 195 of *The Society of the Spectacle*, *Œuvres*, p. 849.
at the level of philosophy itself, in the element of the concept. They literally have nothing to say to one another, and so must resolve their differences on the terrain of social struggle – an expression now enigmatic – with the possible result of the pure and simple elimination of one of the parties. The truth it knows and practices is not the result of a synthesis; it proceeds by scission, introducing an unmediatable antagonism into the limpid air of the idea, a point of the real on which no discussion is to be had. Philosophy is not a science, it is a passion.

I use the word “passion” deliberately. A well-known line from Antoine-Henri Jomini’s Précis de l’art de la guerre – a kind of lesser-known, French Clausewitz – defines war in the following way: “La guerre est un drame passionné et non une science exacte,” “war is a Passion and not an exact science.” Debord pretends to cite (the citation is not exact, in any case) this line in the In girum script, at the end of a paragraph that began with the assertion that theories are made only to die in the war of time. When Debord uses this phrase in the context of a discussion of revolutionary strategy, it is clear that the phrase “positive and dogmatic science” targets the science of historical materialism itself. It had been Debord’s target since the late 1950s, in a combat conditioned in large part by the dominance of the French Communist Party in the political life of the French Left after the war: a Party at once Stalinist and reformist, and whose sole raison d’être seems to have been the heading off the very revolutionary action it theoretically proposed as the only solution to the conscience d’etre. 

In The German Ideology, Marx identified this science with what he called “real knowledge,” a knowledge that will emerge only after the phrases about consciousness cease:

"We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life... Where speculation ends – in real life – there actual, positive science [die wirkliche, positive Wissenschaft] begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Where the phrases about consciousness cease, real knowledge [wirkliches Wissen] has to take its place."

From the moment the form of consciousness itself, rather than this or that determined content, is identified with the ideological operation that inverts the relation between consciousness and real, material processes – making consciousness their origin, rather than a result – it is possible to argue that the ideological forms of consciousness, including those of religion and philosophy themselves, “have no real history”: no history of their own, since they exist as the concealment of their own historical production. This materialist conception of knowledge replaces the “imagined action of imagined subjects” with a knowledge in the real and is by definition refractory to the field of consciousness and its subjective support. Later reformulations of these programmatic lines, first proposed by Marx in the context of a violent critique of the generation of Young Hegelians whose “ideology” is being demolished, eventually took on a decidedly economistic cast: it will become a science of revolutions. These deviant yet dominant forms of historical materialism understood revolutionary collapse as the verifiable outcome of a set of objective laws, and all social instability as the calculable result of, say, the tendency of rate of profit to fall, or as a crisis of overproduction and the resulting impossibility of realizing and recapitalizing surplus

11 Ibid. We know the importance this page would have for Althusser, for whom the form of consciousness itself, and therefore subjectivity in its metaphysical determination, is ideological through and through, and identified with the register of the imaginary – the “imagined activity of imaginary subjects.” Ideology has no history because its precise function is to extirpate the real history of conflict, the differential play and war of forces at its invisible source. Cf. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 159ff.
The most likely, if not necessarily intended, target of Debord's reference to "science" would be Louis Althusser. Althusser's thought was a struggle on two fronts. If it opposed this sort of economism from within the Party, it also attempted to stave off the importation of humanist strains of Marxism from without. Fighting off these opposed tendencies with a theory of the conjuncture, a theory of the specificity of the Marxist dialectic, and a conception of philosophy as a strategic enterprise of "intervention," what Althusser targeted on the humanist flank was the reintroduction of the theory of the subject into the Marxist theoretical field. Such theories, rooted in Lukács's History and Class Consciousness, proliferated in France in the 1950s. They marked a relapse in relation to the prescription introduced by Marx in The German Ideology: replace the "phrases about consciousness" with a "real knowledge." Insofar as Althusser conceived of philosophy as a strategy of "intervention" that would defend the rigor of Marxist science against the left-humanist and right-scientistic deviations - Debord's Hegelianism, on the one hand, Stalinist economism on the other - his own philosophy was conceived as a terrain of struggle, the philosophical act as a strategic one, inserting itself within a field of forces that were always overdetermined: fighting on more than one front, against parties whose objective alliance temporarily suspended their declared hostility.

Debord's theory of the spectacle - at least as it is presented in The Society of the Spectacle - is founded on the theory of commodity fetishism and logic of alienation. But the most powerful theoretical labor of the Situationist International from the early 1960s is the retrieval of a certain figure of the subject conceived as a destructive or viral supplement to the operations and tissue of the spectacular management of appearing. A subject that is Hegelian in the strictest sense: not a thing with properties and predicates, not substance, but a nothing that acts and that is only its own movement, its eradication of all substantial determinations. In a short, unsigned piece published in the seventh issue of Situationist International journal in 1962 ("Les Mauvais Jours Finiront"), for example, this subjective negativity was identified with what the authors call "new resistances" which, in the spectacular form of capitalism, seem incomprehensible from the perspective of older forms of class struggle, identified with the classical proletariat. In this first traversal of the revolutionary cycle, violence was practiced at the point of production, and, in its earliest phases, took the form of direct and spontaneous attacks on machines of production - contemporary acts (or instances) of violence take different targets: the machines of consumption. In the industrialized countries of the early 1960s, "new spontaneous struggles" were emerging that attacked not at the point of production (factories) but in the wider field of circulation and consumption (automobiles, systems of information distribution, and so on). Because they are no longer readable according to the grid of older forms of social war, such spontaneous revolts appear, at the beginning, under a "criminal form" - senseless, irrational, irresponsible, at times unmotivated. Nihilistic, in short:

These are the precursor [avant-coureurs] signs of the second proletarian assault against class society. When the lost children [enfants perdus] of this still immobile army reappear on this battleground, having become other and remained the same, they follow a new "General Ludd" who, this time, launches them into a destruction of the machines of tolerated consumption.14

---

12 More specifically, one can speak here of the "figure" or "configuration" - Gestalt - of subjectivity described by Hegel in his analysis of the French revolution: a terrorist mode of subjectivity, taking that term in the most neutral, descriptive sense possible.
14 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, thesis 115, Œuvres, p. 817. An earlier formulation of this thesis is found in "Les Mauvais Jours Finiront," which speaks of a "first appearance of a wave of vandalism against the machines of consumption," a wave said to mirror the first phase of the proletarian revolts of the 19th century, comprised of "isolated, 'criminal' gestures with the goal of destroying the machines of production" (Internationale situationniste, p. 250).
It is this nihilism of a subject that is nothing but its act of negation, a subject that has not yet assumed the form of a project, the subject as a "passion" that Debord wanted to theorize. The task of a contemporary revolutionary theory was to draw out the necessity and logical consistency of a sequence of apparently spontaneous irruptions that, from the perspective of the objective laws of the economy and its internal contradictions, appear unjustifiable and without a cause. Debord produces a science of revolutions of a different sort: a revolutionary theory that attempts to describe the immanent consistency of an insurrectionary real rather than give form and direction to otherwise incoherent, punctual acts. Strange strategy.

I want to stress the fact that these passionate or spontaneous forms of violence of the initial stage of the second cycle of proletarian assault take on an appearance of "criminality" - actions that open what the Situationist International elsewhere called "positive holes" in the tissue of the spectacular domination. If we return to the voice-over narration of Debord's film, which is largely an account of his own participation in this assault he also claims to have led, he uses the trope of "illegality" to characterize these actions. Describing his first participation in the actions of the Lettrist group in the early 1950s, Debord presents his life as an attempt to live up to the intensity of that first experience, to be worthy of it in such a way that it becomes impossible, almost physically, to renounce it: "The heat and the chills of this epoch never leave you. You have to discover how to live tomorrows that will be worthy of such a beautiful beginning. You want to continue this first experience of illegality forever."15

The semantic range this word opens is broad. It refers to the social milieu within which this "avant-garde" moved: what Debord calls *le pègre*, a world in which the contempt for work and the refusal of the wage relation requires a life devoted to thievery, petty or grand, where a spontaneous refusal to produce wealth requires a diversion, or *détournement* in its more common sense, of already created wealth. To the extent that this delinquent or dangerous class is not a class at all, being completely outside of the wage relation and the class war in its classical formation, it is incapable of organizing its violence in a "conscious" and strategic fashion, as a means subordinated to a clearly articulated social or political demand. Debord puts it like this: "people sincerely ready to set the world on fire to give it a bit more splendor."16 There is also a refusal of another kind, which pushes illegality into an ontological register. Criminality in the eyes of the spectacle takes the form of the clandestine, the refusal to appear according to the mode of phenomenality the spectacle itself imposes. In the metaphysical determination of the spectacle, to be is to appear - to appear before the law of appearance, ordered by the logic of identity and difference - and illegality is identified with a perseverance in one's own non-existence; and the assertion of that non-being as the negation of the nothingness of the spectacle itself. In another text from the same era signed collectively by the Situationist International, we are told that "the entire apparatus of information and discipline in the hands of our enemies, the clandestinity of the *vécu...* is brought to light only with the details of its repression."17

Let's return to the question of strategy. We can see that for Debord what matters is the articulation of the "logic" of theory and the spontaneity of a passion - that is, tracing a rationality through these points of rupture that gives them a consistency. This rationality is not to be confused either with the scientific laws of objective history or its crises. It also differs from the rationality of the Leninist vanguard party itself, which has as its task a logical analysis not of the laws of history but of the concrete situation: a strategic conception of theory that assesses the "rightness" of a conjuncture on the basis of the specific *accumulation* of contradictions in a given historical site, rather than on the basis of a single, fundamental contradiction ordering an entire mode of production. Spontaneity - the great error of working class movements, according to Lenin - is here simply the name for any action that refuses to wait for its blessing from the bureaucrats of historical reason. It is an action that not only refuses to subordinate itself to an end that would order it from without, it must paradoxically "*make* [the] *time,*" to use Debord's phrase, that it nevertheless waits for. "Avant-gardes only have one time, and the best thing that


16 Debord, "*In girum,*" *Œuvres*, p. 1362.

can happen to them is to make their time [faire leur temps]."18 The "real knowledge" of the avant-garde is its discovery that political time is not a formal, homogenous field of action, but is constituted by an act -- a decision and a lunge -- that is ordered by time, but not governed by it. "Those who know how to strike with the time [frapper avec le temps]," Debord's voice-over states, "know that time is both their weapon and their master."

I want to conclude with a passage from In girum where Debord recounts the history of the Situationist International. He is responding to the reproach that he squandered the talents of the advanced detachment he led in the series of purges and struggles of the 1960s and in its dissolution, undertaken unilaterally by Debord in 1972 (the twelfth and last issue of the journal was published in 1969) after the events of May 1968. When Debord spoke of the need to send a theory off into the "war of time," he also insisted that "theories should be replaced, because their decisive victories, even more than their partial defeats, wear them out and use them up [produire leur usure]."19 Then, echoing this passage later in the film, he responds to critics of his actions by asserting that theories have "only one time." He states: "I ask myself what more could some of these people have hoped for? The particular wears itself out and gets used up [s'user] in combat."20 This assertion brings us back to the convergence of passion and strategy. It is a veiled citation -- a détournement to be precise, a kind of embezzling of a theoretical fund -- to a well-known passage in Hegel's Introduction to the Philosophy of History. The passage speaks of the dialectical relation between particular interests or passions and the universal principle of freedom: "This may be called the Cunning of Reason, that it allows the passions to work for it, while what it brings into existences suffers loss and injury ... Compared to the universal, the particular wears itself out and gets used in combat."21

We know the instituted, official reading of this passage. The particular acts out of self-interest and passion, with no consideration of the whole; but there is a reason that constructs itself act by act in the unfolding of history, such that a certain end of history orders these interested actions in view of a design that by necessity exceeds them. What is more, it is the figure of the State in its accomplished form -- the form described by Hegel in his philosophy of Recht -- which is called upon to mediate the conflict between particulars, so that my freedom becomes fully actual only insofar as it is inscribed within the objective logic and order of the State. But Debord offers us -- hints at, that's all -- another reading. In this reading, the universal does not pre-exist these particular passions, but emerges historically through their being set off against each other. The universal is, paradoxically, nothing more than this combat between particulars that, in their struggle, use each other up. The wearing down of the particular, its negation in combat, produces the universal not as the transcendence of their conflict but as its mediation: a strange mediation that does not neutralize these passions, but, to the contrary, is the condition of their being, of their polarization, the ring into which they step, in order to have it out, historically speaking. Reason lets the passions work for it, Debord says, in the sense I have just described: it draws out the rationality peculiar to historical contingency and its antagonisms. This is what, in the next paragraph, Hegel calls the "cunning" or "ruse" of reason. It neither programs these passions nor simply takes leave of them. It is their internal texture, the consistency that gives war a space and time to take place. "Reason," then, is a form of mediation between partisan particulars that does not perform a synthesis of competing interests, being instead the pure opening in which these particulars might encounter each other, the minimal sameness that allows them to encounter each other at all. Reason is the free space of their play, the playing space in which something like war can unfold -- even if this war and this play overlap, or even become indistinguishable in the Grand Jeu of history, a Kriegsspiel whose rules and ruses construct the space of our partisan existence.

If Debord's conception of revolutionary theory draws out the logical consistency specific to spontaneous forms of violence in contemporary class societies, he shares Hegel's insistence that the real of passion is rational, and revolts are logical. What matters is the nature of this logic. There is more than one reason. But I want to stress the question of passion here. For if Debord's In girum tries to answer

18 Debord, Œuvres, p. 1389.
19 Ibid., p. 1354.
20 Ibid., p. 1390.
the question “what are our passions, and where have they led us?”\textsuperscript{22} Hegel’s theory of the cunning of reason presents us with a portrait of historical passion. “Nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion.” For Hegel and Debord, to be possessed by a Passion is radically different from the mere petit bourgeois pittance of an emotion like happiness – and its corollaries, egotism and envy. Passion is in no way a psychological state, a contingent moment in the life of an individuated and abstract I. Greatness indicates the dialectical and conflictual coincidence of a particular passion and the universal. Whoever is consumed by this Passion can, strictly speaking, have no interior life, no inward recesses shielded from the blows of history. The happy are the spectators of history, and their individuality is not even particular, insofar as it is not partisan.\textsuperscript{23} They have not taken sides in the war from which freedom is woven, even as this same freedom gives rise to this war, which is its innermost expression.

\textit{Coda:} In the fourth volume of his \textit{Histoire de la philosophie allemande}, published in 1849, Joseph Wilm characterizes Hegel’s \textit{List der Vernunft} in the following terms: “The ruse in general consists in this roundabout activity – activité détournée – that knows how to arrive at its ends by means of objects, all the while ostensibly allowing them to act according to their own nature.”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22}Debord, \textit{Œuvres}, p. 1355.
\item \textsuperscript{23}Happiness, envy, and egotism: these are the three defining characteristics of the petit bourgeois “person,” according to Hegel.
\end{itemize}